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Notes
Kansas v. Hendricks: Absent a Clear Meaning of
Punishment, States Are Permitted to Violate Double
Jeopardy Clause
"[Mierely redefine any measure which is claimed to be punishment
as 'regulation,' and magically, the Constitution no longer prohibits its
imposition.... [Tihe majority's argument is merely an exercise in
obfuscation.",
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1993, Stephanie Schmidt, a college student in Leawood,
Kansas, was brutally raped and murdered by a former co-worker,
Donald Ray Gideon.2 Gideon finished serving a ten-year sentence for
rape and aggravated sodomy only seven months before taking Ms.
Schmidt's life.3 Outraged by their daughter's murder, Stephanie's
parents formed a task force to pass legislation that would keep
"sexually violent predators" incarcerated for a longer period of time.4
The Schmidts' grief, anger, and frustration gained wide public
sympathy, which resulted in the Sexually Violent Predators Act of
1994 ("the Act" or "SVPA"). 5
The Sexually Violent Predators Act provides for the civil
commitment 6 of persons who have "a mental abnormality"7 and have
1. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 760 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. See Greg Kuhl & Ann Spivak, Leawood Woman Died by Strangling: Sexual
Assault, Killing Apparently Took Place Within Hour After She Left Bar with Convicted
Rapist, KAN. CITY STAR, July 29, 1993, at Al.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See John A. Dvorak, Kansas Passes Death Penalty, KAN. CITY STAR, April 9, 1994,
at Al (describing the reaction of Gene Schmidt, Stephanie's father, to the passage of
more severe punishments for violent criminals). Legislators cited public outrage
expressed on questionnaires rather than the desire to deter crime as their justification for
enacting the law. See id.; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994) (legislation
which allows for the involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent predators).
6. The SVPA requires a person who is found to be a "sexually violent predator" be
"committed to the custody of the secretary of social and rehabilitation services for
control, care and treatment until such time as the person's mental abnormality or
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been convicted of a sexually violent offense or who have a "mental
abnormality" which makes them "likely to engage in predatory acts of
sexual violence.",8 In essence, the Act provides for the involuntary
"civil" commitment of sexually violent predators after they have served
their full prison sentence. 9 Ostensibly, the purpose of the Act is to
provide treatment for sexually violent predators.° After assessing the
Act's actual effects, however, the Supreme Court of Kansas found that
treatment was "all but nonexistent" for those committed under the
Act." Sexually violent predators' commitments are reviewed yearly to
determine whether the predator is still dangerous.12 Under the
review's standards, "dangerous" means that one is likely to commit
another sexually violent crime. 3 The statute mandates that the annual
review be carried out even though the statute specifically admonishes
that the treatment needs of sexually violent predators are "very long
term."'
14
The Act has been criticized for several reasons, including: (1) the
state's failure to provide treatment for those who are committed; 5 (2)
personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at large." KAN. STAT.
ANN. §59-29a07 (1994 & Supp. 1997). In addition, persons committed "shall be kept
in a secure facility and . . . segregated at all times from any other patient under the
supervision of the secretary of social and rehabilitation services[.]" Id. Furthermore,
those who are committed may be confined, housed and managed by the department of
corrections provided that those civilly committed have only "supervised incidental
contact" with those criminals housed by the department of corrections. Id.
7. A "mental abnormality" is defined as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting
the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually
violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety
of others." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (amended 1998).
8. Id. § 59-29a01.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Kansas v.
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997). The Kansas Supreme Court found the fundamental
concern of the legislature to be the continued segregation of sexually violent offenders
from the public. See id. "Treatment with the goal of reintegrating them [those
committed under the SVPA] into society is incidental, at best. The record reflects that
treatment for sexually violent predators is all but nonexistent. . . . [T]he provisions of
the Act for treatment appear somewhat disingenuous." Id.
12. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29(a)08 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (amended 1998).
13. See id.
14. See id. § 59-29a01. In its interpretation of the statute, the Supreme Court of
Kansas found that the State's failure to provide treatment for sexually violent predators,
coupled with the statute's statement that treatment must be "very long term" made review
of the civil commitment futile. See infra Part IV.
15. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 136. Specifically, the court stated that the
legislature conceded the fact that "sexually violent predators are not amenable to
treatment under K.S.A. 59-2901 et seq. If there is nothing to treat under 59-2901, then
there is no mental illness. In that light, the provisions of the Act for treatment appear
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the statute's requirement of "very long term" treatment periods for
sexually violent predators, despite the fact that no real treatment is
provided; 16 and (3) because the attempt to create a basis for a civil
commitment has been heralded as "the most significant preventive
criminal justice legislation to be presented."' 17 These three criticisms,
combined with the political and social reality that this piece of
legislation was motivated by the "grief, anger and frustration" 8 felt by
Stephanie Schmidt's parents, friends and fellow Kansans, have led
many to question the purported purposes of the Act.19 These critics
regard the Sexually Violent Predators Act as a method to further
punish "monsters ' 2O after they have been convicted of a crime, in
blatant violation of the Double Jeopardy provisions of the Fifth
Amendment. El
In 1997, the Supreme Court considered these criticisms 22 and
determined that Kansas's Sexually Violent Predators Act does not
violate the Double Jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment or the
prohibition against ex post facto laws. 3 The Court based its decision
on Mr. Hendricks's failure to demonstrate with "the clearest proof'
somewhat disingenuous." Id. (discussing the Kansas statute allowing short term
involuntary treatment of "mentally ill persons" as opposed to sexually violent
predators)
16. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01.
17. Sexually Violent Predators Act, 1994: Hearings on S.B. 525 Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., Kan. Leg. (Feb. 22, 1994) (statement of Robert T. Stephan, Att'y
Gen. of the State of Kansas) (emphasis added).
18. See Sexually Violent Predators Act, 1994: Hearings on S.B. 525 Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm., Kan. Leg. (Feb. 22, 1994) (statement of Kelly McCaffrey,
author of Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators in Kansas: A
Modem Law for Modem Times, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 887 (1994)).
19. See Sexually Violent Predators Act, 1994: Hearings on S.B. 525 Before the House
Judiciary Subcomm., Kan. Leg. (Feb. 22, 1994) (statement of Betty K. Meyers,
Legislative liaison [sic] Public Policy Council, Mental Health Associations in Kansas)
(dubbing the SVPA the "Stephanie Schmidt Bill" and urging the Kansas legislature to
deal with repeat offenders through the criminal justice system rather than through civil
commitment); Sexually Violent Predators Act, 1994: Hearings on S.B. 525 Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm., Kan Leg. (Feb. 23, 1994) (letter from Carla Dugger, Assoc.
Dir. The American Civil Liberties Union of Kansas and Western Missouri) (criticizing
the SVPA as a "vague" civil remedy for a criminal process problem while providing only
"an illusion of due process"); see also In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 136-37 (finding that
the primary objective of the Act is to continue incarceration and not to provide
treatment; the court also pointed out that Hendricks was susceptible to at least 60 years
imprisonment when he was sentenced).
20. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 136.
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2084-85 (1997), rev'g In re
Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996).
23. See id. at 2086.
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that his involuntary commitment had the purpose or effect of negating
the civil label ascribed to the statute which provided for his
commitment.24 Since the commitment, in the majority's view, did not
serve either of the primary objectives of punishment-that is,
deterrence or retribution-the commitment did not amount to
punishment.25 According to the majority, the Double Jeopardy
provisions prohibit only a second punishment, not a "civil" penalty
coupled with a criminal punishment.2 6 However, the majority opinion
failed to look at the purposes and effects of the Act, to consider the
findings of the Kansas Supreme Court, to follow preceding cases
concerning punishment and double jeopardy, or to sufficiently
illuminate its definition of punishment.
This Note will briefly describe the traditional division between civil
and criminal trials and proceedings and how the distinctions between
these two areas of law have eroded within the past century.27
Subsequently, this Note will assess how some legal philosophers have
defined punishment, the term which has historically separated criminal
and civil law.28  Next, this Note will trace the Supreme Court's
treatment of punishment since the early 1960's.29 This Note will then
discuss the majority, 3° concurring, 3 and dissenting32 opinions in
Kansas v. Hendricks.33  The Note will then criticize the Court's
decision in light of previous double jeopardy cases and other states'
sexually violent predator laws.34 Finally, this Note concludes that in
the absence of a clear meaning of "punishment," the Fifth
Amendment's protections against a police state will continue to be
winnowed away by an "administrative state" operating under the guise
of "civil" law and regulation.35
24. See id. at 2082 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 ) (1980)).
25. See id. The majority was comprised of Justice Thomas, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. See id. at 2076. Justice Kennedy also
provided a separate concurring opinion. See id. at 2087. Justice Breyer filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg joined. See id.
26. See id. at 2085 (citing Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 396 (1995)).
27. See infra Part II.A.
28. See infra Part II.B.
29. See infra Part II.C.
30. See infra Part II.C.1.
31. See infra Part III.C.2.
32. See infra Part III.C.3.
33. See infra Part III.C.
34. See infra Parts IV.A.1-2.
35. See infra Part V.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Eroding Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Law
The roots of the distinction between civil and criminal law can be
traced to Roman law. In Roman law, certain "wrongs," such as
robbery and theft, were treated as "private" torts, whereas other acts,
such as murder, were regarded as "public" crimes. a6 The English
common law similarly attempted to delineate between criminal and civil
law with varying degrees of success, through its use of different types
of writs.37 Writs were pursued either by the victim of the wrong or by
the Crown." The distinction between civil and criminal law,
however, was often hard to draw under this system of writs because
criminal, tort, and contract laws overlapped. 9 Also, prosecutions
depended not on the acts of the defendant or accused but on which writ
the plaintiff or prosecutor pursued.4" Separating criminal procedures
from civil procedures did not become possible until a more organized
police force or investigating agency was devised.4" As the state, rather
than individuals, assumed the power of investigating wrongs and
crimes at its discretion, the number of crimes prosecuted by the state
increased, and modem criminal procedure began to take shape.42
The early American distinction between civil and criminal law
depended upon whether the state imposed punitive or remedial
sanctions.43 Although this distinction seems reasonable, the state's
increasing use of punitive sanctions in civil cases and remedial actions
in criminal cases has clouded the distinction and generated hybrid legal
36. See Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 782 (1997) (citing James Lindgren,
Why the Ancients May Not Have Needed a System of Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 29,
38 (1996)).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort, in the Early
Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 59, 83 (1996). The distinction between private actions,
be they intentional or negligent, and public prosecutions rested not in the acts of the
defendant, but in the writ pursued by the plaintiff/prosecutor. See id. Since the
differences between crime and tort were decided by the individual victims, delineating a
crime from a tort was useless. See id.
40. See id.
41. See JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL
POLICY 7, 8 (1969).
42. See id. at 13-15.
43. See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1796 (1992).
1998]
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practices. 44 Attempts to maintain the punitive/remedial distinction
between civil and criminal law lasted through the early part of the
twentieth century, but the amalgamation of civil procedure and criminal
punishment progressed as the number of "hybrid" legal practices
expanded.45 Some of these "hybrid" practices, which seek punitive
ends through civil proceedings, are punitive damages in tort cases,
administrative legal procedures for conduct that is generally regarded
as criminal, strict liability in certain criminal cases, and civil forfeiture
for criminal acts.46 This hybridization of criminal and civil law has
made it difficult for courts to determine whether to apply the broad
protections afforded by criminal law or the more lenient rules provided
under civil procedure.47
Just as the delineations between criminal and civil proceedings have
blurred, the characterization of defendants in criminal and civil settings
also has undergone significant change. 48 No longer are those who
face involuntary civil commitment merely considered "mad" and those
charged with a crime simply considered "bad"; rather, courts and
legislatures have combined these two groups into the "dangerous.
49
The original "mad" versus "bad" schism drew upon a distinction
between two types of people who broke the law.5" "Bad" people were
those who broke the law because they were morally corrupt and,
therefore, deserving of punishment." Whereas "mad" people were
those who broke the law because their mental abnormalities caused
them to be psychologically incapable of controlling their behavior.52
Hence, the state placed those deemed "mad" in mental asylums in
order to provide them with a "cure."53
44. See id. at 1797-98.
45. See Steiker, supra note 36, at 783-84. The distinction did not fade easily or
quickly, however. See id. The attempts at maintaining the sharp distinction can be seen
in one opinion from the late 1800's where the judge questioned, "How could the idea of
punishment be deliberately and designedly installed as a doctrine of civil remedies? Is
not punishment out of place, irregular, anomalous, exceptional, unjust, unscientific, not
to say absurd and ridiculous, when classed among civil remedies?" Id. (quoting Fay v.
Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873)); see also Mann, supra note 43, at 1799 (discussing
punitive civil sanctions as a "middleground" that provides the basis for the
civil/criminal "hybrid").
46. See Mann, supra note 43, at 1871.
47. See id.
48. See Steiker, supra note 36, at 784.
49. Seeid.
50. See id. at 788.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 799.
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As the science of psychiatry and psychoanalysis grew through the
early and middle twentieth century, many in the mental health field
advocated treating crime as a disease. Therefore, their primary goal
was to rehabilitate or cure criminals of whatever mental abnormality or
illness caused them to commit a crime.' 4 The view that "rehabilitation"
was a desirable or attainable goal for wrongdoers came under attack
from both ends of the political spectrum in the last half of the twentieth
century.55 The political left criticized rehabilitation as a means of
incarcerating people for an indefinite period of time while imposing
unwanted "treatments" that cruelly and unalterably change the
individual's core attributes.56 The political right regarded rehabilitation
as not being severe enough in administering "just desserts."57 The
distinction between treating the "mad" and punishing the "bad" was
further weakened because many of those who were purportedly cured
often continued to commit crimes after they received treatment.5 8 The
tension between wanting to provide treatment to the mentally ill and
wanting to protect the public from all people who commit crimes be
they "mad," "bad," or most likely a bit of both, led to the creation of a
new characterization of criminals, the "dangerous."59 Thus, the term
54. See Karl Menninger, The Crime of Punishment, SATURDAY REVIEW (1968),
reprinted in JOEL FEINBERG, REASON & RESPONSIBILITY 444-445 (7th ed. 1989).
55. See Steiker, supra note 36, at 790.
56. See id. C. S. Lewis criticized the view that treatment for criminals was a desirable
end. See C. S. LEWIS, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in GOD IN THE DOCK
(1970), reprinted in JOEL FEINBERG, REASON & RESPONSIBILITY 448, 448 (7th ed. 1989).
Lewis criticized the Humanitarian Theory, which is that criminals may be healed because
it allows foolish and wicked leaders to deprive citizens of their liberty whenever a state
of mind is found to be displeasing to these leaders. See id. at 450-51. Extreme
interpretations of what might result if treatment were instilled upon those who broke the
law can be seen in two films, namely, Stanley Kubrick's A CLOCKWORK ORANGE, and
Milos Forman's ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO'S NEST. A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (Warner
Bros. 1971); ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO'S NEST (Republic Pictures 1975).
57. See Steiker, supra note 36, at 790; see also MICHAEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND
PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 22-23 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1977)
(1979). Foucault discussed the entangling of the judge's power to punish and her extra
non-judicial duties, such as determining whether the defendant is "dangerous" and
whether it would be better to commit the defendant to a hospital for treatment or to force
the defendant into submission through punishment. See id. These considerations were
part of what Foucault called the "new power to judge." Id. at 23. The power to judge was
"new" in the sense that it was part of a new "scientifico-legal complex" that required the
blending of scientific discourses such as sociology, penology, psychology/psychiatry
and law when passing sentence. See id. This term of "scientifico-legal" demonstrates
the eroding division between the criminal and civil realms as is reflected in the very
scientific perspectives taken in committing the mentally ill under civil law and the legal
rules, powers and ideas of retribution seen under criminal law. See id.
58. See Steiker, supra note 36, at 790-91.
59. See id. at 791.
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"dangerous" has permeated the modem criminal law vernacular in
order to justify incarcerating those who have broken the law but are
mentally defective.6 ° Because the term "dangerous" has dulled the
moral culpability wedge that divided the "bad" and "mad," a number of
people who might otherwise have received "civil" treatments instead
have been criminally punished.6
B. Philosopher's Attempts to Define Punishment
Drawing upon the link between moral blame and criminal liability,
philosophers for many years have debated the justifications of
punishing those who commit criminal acts.62 Yet, discussions on
what exactly constitutes punishment often have been assumed or
ignored by those who argue punishment's justifications. 63 H. L. A.
Hart's five-part definition of punishment is often regarded as the
starting point for defining punishment. 64  Hart conceives of
punishment in the following way:
(1) [Punishment] must involve pain or other consequences
normally considered unpleasant;
(2) it must be for an offense against legal rules;
(3) it must be of an actual or supposed offender for his
offense;
(4) it must be intentionally administered by human beings
other than the offender; and
(5) it must be imposed and administered by an authority
60. See id.
6 1. See id. at 794.
62. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 194-95 (W. Hastie
trans., T. & T. Clark 1887) (advocating punishment purely for retribution); EMILE
DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 108-09 (George Simpson trans., The Free
Press 1964) (stating that punishment is necessary for the satisfaction of the moral
conscience of society). But see generally JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW,
in BENTHAM'S WORKS, pt.2 bk.1, ch.3 (J. Bowring ed., 1843), reprinted in SANFORD H.
KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW & ITS PROCESSES 115-16 (6th ed.
1995) (discussing the utilitarian views including deterrence and curing criminals); Johs
Andenaes, General Prevention, 43 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 176, 179 (1952)
(describing the need to focus on general prevention instead of retributive individual
prevention for deterrence purposes); Leon Radzinowicz & J.W. Turner, A Study of
Punishment I: Introductory Essay, 21 CAN. B. REV. 91, 91 (1943) (delineating the three
main stages of penal policy and the moral philosophies developed over the past 150
years); MICHAEL MOORE, LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 238-43
(1984) (arguing for a hybrid theory of punishment resting in part on retributivism and in
part on utilitarianism).
63. See Steiker, supra note 36, at 799.
64. See id. at 800.
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constituted by a legal system against which the offense is
committed.65
These five factors reveal Hart's view of punishment as
simultaneously limited yet broad. First, Hart's view on punishment is
limited in the sense that punishment can only be derived from an
"offense against legal rules." 66 In making punishment applicable only
to the violation of a legal rule, Hart makes punishment a special type of
penalty or "unpleasant consequence," distinct from other types of
sanctions for violating social norms or the rules of a game.67 Hart's
view on punishment is broad in the sense that it takes into account all
"unpleasant consequences," not simply traditional styles of
punishment such as incarceration, corporal punishment, or monetary
fines.68 On the other hand, Hart's view does not require that the
punishment actually be unpleasant for the offender; rather, the
consequences must be what are "normally considered unpleasant."69
65. H. L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 4-5 (1968).
66. Id. at 5.
67. See id. Hart's view supports the following hypothetical: if a professional
basketball player were to choke his or her coach, and was consequently fined several
thousand dollars and suspended for one year by the sport's oversight organization, this
hypothetical player would not technically have been "punished" since he or she did not
receive the penalty from an authority constituted by a legal system against which the
offense was committed. Similarly, if the coach sued the player in civil court and
recovered for the damages incurred, it does not appear that there would be "punishment"
in Hart's estimation because the court which would award the judgment would not be "an
authority constituted by a legal system against which the offense was committed." Id. at
5. (emphasis added). However, if the coach pressed charges and the player was tried for
battery in a criminal court and fined, this would be punishment, for it would have been
administered to an offender of a legal rule by a constituent of the legal system against
which the offense was committed. Therefore, the player might personally find the
sanctions imposed by the oversight committee to be more severe than a criminal
punishment of prison or community service, but Hart's view would only consider the
criminal sanction to be punishment. See id.
68. See id. In his earlier versions of this definition, Hart used only the word "pain"
instead of coupling pain with other "unpleasant consequences." See Steiker, supra note
36, at 800.
69. See HART, supra note 65, at 4-5. However, some would argue that prisons are not
what one would normally consider unpleasant. For example, Fyodor Dostoevsky
questioned:
Are there not, also, poor devils who commit crimes in order to be sent to hard
labour, and thus to escape the liberty which is much more painful than
confident? . . . In the convict prison his work will be less severe, less
crushing [than working as a free man]. He will eat as much as he wants, better
than he could ever have hoped to eat, had he remained free. On holidays he
will have meat, and fine people will give him alms, and his evening's work
will bring him in some money.
FYODOR DOSTEVSKY, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD 57-60 (H. Sutherland Edwards trans.,
Everyman's Library 1912), reprinted in JOEL FEINBERG, REASON & RESPONSIBILITY 452,
453 (7th ed. 1989).
19981
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Joel Feinberg and others have criticized Hart for leaving out one of
the most basic and fundamental characteristics of punishment, namely,
the notion of "stigma,"7 ° "blame,"'" or an expression of "resentment
and indignation"7 2  toward the criminal wrongdoer.7 3  Other
philosophers have gone beyond Feinberg's concept of "blame" or
"resentment and indignation" and have offered the view of "defeating"
the wrongdoer.74 According to this view, punishment should be a
means of erasing or assuaging the moral injuries that the criminal has
inflicted on his victim or others.75
C. S. Lewis argued that moral blame is necessary in punishment.76
Lewis asserted that "desert," meaning deserving of retribution based
on the degree of an act's wickedness, "is the only connecting link
between punishment and justice."77 That is, a punishment for an act of
wickedness only can be just if it is deserved.78 According to Lewis, a
punishment may deter others or rehabilitate the criminal, but one
cannot ask whether deterrence is just; one only can ask whether it
deters.7 9 Similarly, one cannot ask whether rehabilitation is just; one
only can ask whether the rehabilitation succeeds in "curing" the
Stephanie Schmidt's father echoed the sentiment expressed by the great Russian writer
when he lamented that, "the system rewards criminals .... He'll [Gideon, Stephanie's
killer] get to play basketball and watch color TV and cable. It's more comfortable in
there." Christine Vendel, Angry Parents of Victim Ask: 'Why Was This Man Released?',
KAN. CITY STAR, July 29, 1993, at A10. In response to Mr. Schmidt's complaint,
followers of Foucault would argue that the unpleasantness of incarceration is not the loss
of material objects, rather the loss of "individual liberty which is regarded both as a
right and as property. . . . Physical pain, the pain of the body itself, is no longer the
constituent element of the penalty. From being an art of unbearable sensations
punishment has become an economy of suspended rights." FOUCAULT, supra note 57, at
11.
70. Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in 4 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW:
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 87, 91-92 (Jules L. Coleman ed., 1994).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 93.
73. Id. Hart's omission of a notion of "stigma" or "resentment and indignation" is
based on his observation that there are occasions, such as strict liability crimes, when
the notion of blame is generally separated from punishment. See HART, supra note 65,
at 223. Furthermore, Hart's theory of legal positivism asserts that law and morality are
not necessarily connected or related; thus, the legal determination to impose
punishment does not necessarily require the moral determination that the defendant or
wrongdoer is morally "bad." See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 7-8 (1961).
74. See Streiker, supra note 36, at 803.
75. See id.
76. See LEWIS, supra note 56, at 448.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
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criminal.80 It only makes sense to ask whether the punishment was a
just dessert-in other words, whether the punishment matched the
wickedness displayed by the criminal. 81
C. The Supreme Court's Views on Punishment and Double Jeopardy
Although theorists and philosophers have the freedom to draw upon
many sources when assessing what punishment is or should be, courts
work within the confines of constitutions, case law, statutes, and
federalism when considering what constitutes punishment. For these
reasons, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to define "punishment"
concretely.82
Despite the Court's reluctance to provide a clear definition of
punishment, determining when punishment exists is necessary to
provide a measure for distinguishing between civil sanctions and
criminal punishments.83 As noted earlier, the division between civil
and criminal sanctions determines whether a person's rights against
double jeopardy, as provided in the Fifth Amendment, have been
80. See id.
8 1. See id. While incarceration might be called treatment, Lewis opined that there is
really no difference between incarceration and treatment. See id. at 449-50.
Specifically, Lewis said:
To be taken without consent from my home and friends; to lose my liberty; to
undergo all those assaults on my personality which modem psychotherapy
knows how to deliver; to be re-made after some pattern of "normality" hatched
in a Viennese laboratory to which I never professed allegiance; to know that
this process will never end until either my captors have succeeded or I have
grown wise enough to cheat them with apparent success-who cares whether
this is called Punishment or not? That it includes most of the elements for
which any punishment is feared-shame, exile, bondage, and years eaten by the
locust-is obvious. Only enormous ill-desert could justify it ....
Id.
82. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963). Justice Goldberg
for the majority stated that determining whether a statute is penal or regulatory in
character has been "extremely difficult and elusive." Id. He continued by listing seven
factors that should be considered. See id. Furthermore, Justice Goldberg stated that the
factors are all relevant to determining whether a sanction is penal or regulatory and that
the evaluation of these factors "may often point in differing directions." Id.
83. See id. at 167 (providing a list of factors which indicate when the purpose of a
civil sanction is punishment); see also infra Part II. The factors include the following:
(1) "whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it
has historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3) "whether it comes into play only on
a finding of scienter"; (4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it"; and (7) "whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned." Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
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violated.' The Court has held that there are three occasions85 in which
a person could be said to be "twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."86
These three circumstances are: "a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense."87 The
third of these provisions, the prohibition against multiple punishments,
has caused the greatest contention among the Supreme Court,
particularly within the past ten years. 8
1. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez: The Court's Early Efforts to
Establish Criteria Which Separate Civil Sanctions from Criminal
Punishment
In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court consolidated several of its
previous Double Jeopardy decisions into a list of factors to assist
courts in determining when Congress sought to punish through civil
procedures.8 9 In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court
84. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Double Jeopardy provision states in full, "nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." Id.; see also Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (listing factors which can be
indicative of punishment); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989) (holding
that civil sanctions which may not be characterized as remedial, but as serving the
purposes of deterrence or retribution can constitute punishment), overruled by Hudson v.
United States, 118 S.Ct. 488 (1997); Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch,
511 U.S. 767, 784 (1994) (holding that a tax which is 800% of the value of seized
marijuana could be regarded as punitive), overruled in part as stated in State v. Uher,
1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1708 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). But see Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at
802-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court's holding is improper because the
double jeopardy clause prohibits one from twice being subject to prosecution, not
punishment, and that a more reasonable justification for the Court's decision would be
under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits excessive fines or penalties).
85. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 440.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
87. Halper, 490 U.S. at 440 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717
(1969)).
88. See, e.g., Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 798 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
stated that "'to be put in jeopardy' does not remotely mean 'to be punished,' so by its
terms this provision prohibits, not multiple punishments, but only multiple
prosecutions." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). In another case, Justice Scalia declared that
the protections against multiple punishments by way of the Double Jeopardy Clause is
unworkable and creates inconsistent results. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389,
406-07 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). In his dissent in
Witte, Justice Stevens opined that the Court had strayed from its earlier decisions that
multiple punishments are prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at 413
(Stevens, J., ,dissenting) (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 448; Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 779-
80).
89. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (citing
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96-7
(1958); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946); United States v.
Kansas v. Hendricks
confronted the issue of whether citizens who had served a prison
sentence for avoiding military duty could be later stripped of their
American citizenship. 90 The Court held that determining whether a
statute is punitive or regulatory in nature begins by first looking to
whether there were "objective manifestations of congressional purpose
[which] indicate[d] conclusively that the provisions in question can
only be interpreted as punitive."9' To demonstrate the penal purpose
of the statute under the Court's consideration, Justice Goldberg looked
to congressional debates and hearings, as well as interpretations of
lower courts of the predecessor law, to determine whether the drafters
of the law perceived the sanctions imposed on deserters to be penalties
and "punishment" for a "crime. 92 In considering the most recent
version of that law, the Court analyzed a letter from the Attorney
General as well as a statement in the Congressional Record by Senator
Russell.93 Both the Senator and the Attorney General regarded the
legislation's sanctions as a penalty. 94 The letter from the Attorney
General and Senator Russell's statement, combined with the legislative
history of the preceding statute, indicated that the statute was intended
to be punitive. 95
Without such secondary information, the Court would have applied
the following considerations to the statute to determine whether on its
face the statute was punitive:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims
of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior
to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable
for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 37-38, 43
(1922); Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 610-12 (1903); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1896); Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 350-52
(1886); Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426-29 (1885); Exparte Garland, 4 Wall. 333,
377 (1866); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 320-21 (1866)).
90. Id. at 146-47.
91. Id. at 169.
92. See id. at 171-74.
93. See id. at 180.
94. See id. at 183. Senator Russell stated in part that "this bill would merely impose
a similar penalty on those who are not subject to the jurisdiction of our courts, the
penalty being the same as would result in the case of those who are subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts." Id. (emphasis added) (citing 90 CONG. REc. S7629 (1944)).
95. See id.
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alternative purpose assigned .... 96
The Court did not conclude that the statute is considered inherently
punitive if some or all of the factors listed above are found within the
statute.97 Rather, the Court stated that the presence of these factors
would tend to indicate the punitive nature of the statute.9 8
Accordingly, the list of criteria or factors put forth by the Court were
not meant to be exhaustive or complete, and the application of the
factors may lead in "differing directions."'
Following the pronouncement in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
the issue of whether a civil sanction constitutes a punishment was not
frequently revisited by the Court. Even when the issue arose, reliance
upon or utilization of the case was sporadic at best. °°
2. The 1980s: The Rebirth of the Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez Decision
In 1980, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of whether civil
sanctions constitute punishment.1"1 In United States v. Ward, the
defendant owned an oil company which spilled waste into a
waterway. 10 2 In accordance with a federal civil statute, Ward reported
the spill and was fined $500.1°3 Ward appealed the fine and argued
96. See id. at 168-69 (citations omitted).
97. See id. at 169.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 169. An example of differing conclusions in the application of the
factors listed by the Court can be seen in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). In
determining whether pretrial detention of defendants in criminal cases constituted
punishment, the majority of the Court held that the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
factors tended to show that such detention was not punishment. See id. at 538-39.
Contrarily, Justice Marshall in his dissent viewed the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
considerations as favorable to his position that the pretrial detainment of defendants in
criminal cases does constitute punishment. See id. at 564-65 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100. See, e.g., One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 233-37
(1972) (per curiam). The Court considered whether the forfeiture of an assortment of
jewelry under a civil statute constituted a punishment. See id. at 233. In concluding that
the forfeiture did not constitute a punishment, the Court did not even mention Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, much less discuss its seven factors. See id. at 237. The Court
determined that the statutory scheme sufficiently distinguished criminal and civil
procedures and sanctions and that the sanctions were a "reasonable form of liquidated
damages" which served to reimburse the Government for expenses incurred in enforcing
the law. See id. at 236-37.
101. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980). While the Court was not
considering punishment in terms of the Double Jeopardy Clause, its considerations were
still focused on whether a civil sanction was punitive, thereby giving rise to protections
against compulsory self-incrimination. See id. at 247-48; see also U.S. CONST. amend.
V.
102. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 246.
103. See id. at 246-47.
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that the reporting requirements of the statute, in question violated his
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. °4 In order to
determine whether the $500 Ward paid was punitive, the Court
assessed whether the statute was criminal, notwithstanding the "civil"
label ascribed to it. 105
Concluding that the sanction was not a punishment, the Court
reiterated that statutory construction determined whether a sanction
was punitive."° If a statute expressly or implicitly creates a criminal
punishment, then that label shall stand.0 7 If, however, the statute
expressly or implicitly creates a civil sanction, then the sanction shall
be assessed to determine whether by the "clearest proof" that the
statute is so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate the civil
intention. 0 8 The Court considered the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
factors but only found the fifth factor of whether "the behavior to
which [the penalty applies] is already a crime," favorable to Ward. 0 9
The statute that would find Ward guilty of a strict liability crime"0 was
drafted seventy years before the statute that would impose a civil
sanction."' Based on its rationale in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v.
United States," 2 the Court ruled that in as much as a separation of
criminal punishments and civil sanctions within a statute was
important, a chasm of seventy years between a statute creating criminal
punishments and one establishing civil sanctions was sufficient to
dilute the importance of the fifth Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
factor.' "
104. See id. at 247. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating "nor shall [any
person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself').
105. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 248.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 249 (citing Hemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617-21 (1960)).
109. See id. at 249-50 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-
69 (1963)).
110. See 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1994).
111. See 33 U.S.C. §1321(b)(3,5,6) (1994).
112. 409 U.S. 232 passim (1972); see also supra note 100.
113. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 250. The fifth Mendoza-Martinez factor inquires whether
the act sanctioned in a purportedly civil proceeding is already a crime. See Kennedy,
372 U.S. at 168. The Court in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States determined
that sanctions which are distinct and contained in different parts of the statutory scheme
tend to indicate that the civil sanction is not related to the criminality of the same
conduct. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 236. The Ward Court similarly
concluded that the sanctions involved in this case were not meant to be criminal
punishments because the remedies were in a separate provision than the criminal
remedies, and because the civil sanctions were adopted seventy years after the criminal
punishments, thereby suggesting that the legislature did not intend the civil sanctions
1998]
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3. United States v. Halper: The Court Broadens its Inquiry from the
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez Factors to the Purpose of the Civil
Sanction
Following United States v. Ward, the Court again faced the issue of
whether a sanction was criminal or civil in nature in United States v.
Halper. la Convicted of filing false Medicare claims, the defendant,
Dr. Halper, was ordered to serve a two-year prison sentence and pay a
$5,000 fine. 15 Subsequently, the Government brought a civil action
for the same Medicare violations. 116 - The statute allows the
Government to assess $2,000 for each violation of the Medicare laws;
hence the Government sought damages totaling $130,000 even though
Dr. Halper only filed $585 worth of false claims.'17 The district court
determined that a judgment which was 220 times greater than the actual
damages incurred by the Government would be punitive and,
therefore, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.1 8 The court
then lowered the fine to $1,170 plus costs.119 The United States took
direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court, which unanimously
vacated the $1,170 judgment entered by the district court but agreed
that $130,000 sought by the Government was so extreme as to be
punitive.1 20 Accordingly, the penalty allowable under the statute
constituted an unconstitutional second punishment.1 2'
In holding that a civil sanction that serves the goals of punishment
can violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution, Justice
Blackmun traced the historical roots of the prohibition against multiple
punishments in Anglo-American law. E12  In his decision, Justice
Blackmun cited the 1641 "Body of Liberties" from the Colony of
Massachusetts, James Madison's initial version of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, and Exparte Lange from 1874.123 After establishing
to serve a punitive intent. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 250-51.
114. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
115. See id. at 437.
116. See id. at 438.
117. See id. at 439 (citing United States v. Halper, 660 F.Supp 531, 533 (S.D.N.Y.
1987)) (stating that damages could also possibly include the cost of investigating and
prosecuting the case).
118. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 439-40; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
119. See Halper at 490.
120. See id. at 452.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 440.
123. See id. The Body of Liberties from the Colony of Massachusetts stated: "No
man shall be twice sentenced by Civil Justice for one and the same Crime, offense, or
Trespasse." Id. (citing American Historical Documents 1000-1904, 43 Harvard Classics
66, 72 (C. Eliot ed. 1910)). The initial Double Jeopardy Clause, by James Madison,
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historical precedent for its decision, the Court went on to reject the
Government's argument that earlier cases 124 barred the Court from
determining that civil sanctions, even sanctions in excess of the
Government's damages, were actually a punishment. 125
The Court also distinguished Helvering v. Mitchell, a case the
Government heavily relied upon, from the case at hand. 26 The
defendant in Mitchell, unlike Dr. Halper, was acquitted of criminal
charges before he was subsequently sued by the government in a civil
suit. 12 Therefore, there was no possibility of a double punishment
even if the civil sanctions were regarded as criminal punishment.2 8 In
addition, the Court read Justice Brandeis' Mitchell opinion, which
distinguished between the Double Jeopardy Clause's, prohibition
against "attempting a second time to punish criminally" and its
prohibition against "merely punishing twice," as leaving open the
possibility that a civil sanction could constitute punishment. 129 The
Court reasoned that because the word "criminally" is conspicuously
missing from the phrase "merely punishing twice," Mitchell explicitly
allowed for the case in which a civil penalty could violate Double
explicitly focused on multiple punishment proclaiming that, "[n]o person shall be
subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or one trial for
the same offense." See id. (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 434 (1789-1791 ) (J. Gales ed.
1834)). Finally, the Court in Ex parte Lange found, "[i]f there is anything settled in the
jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished
for the same offense." Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 168 (1874), overruled as stated in
United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1981).
124. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 441 (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398-
99 (1938)) (holding that a 50% tax imposed on those who intended to evade income tax
was not a criminal punishment). The Government also relied on United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943), superseded by 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1976), in
which the Court denied a Double Jeopardy claim asserted by defendants who pled nolo
contendere to defrauding the government and were fined $54,000 in a criminal
proceeding and subsequently had to pay a $315,000 in a qui tam civil action for the same
violations. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 443-44.
125. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 441-42.
126. See id. at 444.
127. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 396 (1938).
128. See id. at 398-99. The only possibility of a Double Jeopardy problem in
Mitchell was if the 50% tax levied on the defendant for evading his income taxes was
intended as punishment thereby making the proceeding criminal and violating the
defendant's Fifth Amendment right to be free from being tried twice in a criminal
proceeding. See id. at 398. The Court in Mitchell determined that the 50% tax was not
arbitrarily arrived at and merely provided the Government indemnification for its losses;
thus, the sanction was remedial and not punitive in nature. See id. at 401. Furthermore,
the statute in Mitchell was drafted so as to create two distinct provisions imposing
sanctions, one criminal and one civil, and the 50% tax was held to be a civil sanctions
and not a criminal punishment. See id. at 402.
129. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 443 (quoting Helvering, 303 U.S. at 399).
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Although United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess appeared on the
surface to be identical to Halper, Justice Blackmun similarly
distinguished it from that case. 131 In Hess, the defendants entered a
nolo contendere plea in a criminal proceeding for bidding collusively
on a public-works project. 132 The defendants paid a $54,000 criminal
fine and were subsequently sued in a qui tam action for $315,000,
which represented a $2,000 civil penalty for each violation plus double
the amount of actual damages and the costs of the suit. 133 The Court
rejected the defendants' position that these amounts represented a
double punishment, reasoning that the statute in Hess sought to ensure
that the Government would be made completely whole.' 34
Additionally, the Government only received $150,000 from the qui
tam action, although its actual damages totaled $101,500. 35 These
two amounts were regarded by the Court as roughly equal.
36
Unlike the sanctions imposed in earlier cases, the sanction
demanded by the Government in Halper did not even closely
approximate the Government's actual costs. 3 7 To remedy this
excessive penalty, the Court concluded that the "criminal" or "civil"
label was not of paramount importance in determining whether the
double jeopardy provisions apply. 38 Rather, a double jeopardy
examination focuses on whether the goals of the sanctions are punitive
or remedial.'39 Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the
State from subjecting a defendant to an additional civil sanction if two
criteria are met: (1) the civil sanction serves no rational relation to the
goal of making the Government whole; and (2) the sanction may be
characterized as serving the goals of punishment, namely, deterrence
or retribution, even though the defendant already has been subjected to
a criminal punishment. 40 This decision also ostensibly protects
130. See id.
131. See id. at 443-45 (discussing Hess, 317 U.S. at 551-52).
132. See Hess, 317 U.S. at 539, 545.
133. See id. at 540.
134. See id. at 548-49.
135. See id. at 545.
136. See id. at 549. The Court did not express an opinion as to whether a qui tam
action should be regarded as a suit between private parties, or between the United States
and another party. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 n.11 (1989),
overruled by Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).
137. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 446.
138. See id. at 447.
139. See id. at 447-48.
140. See id. at 499-50.
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against the possibility that the Government could seek a second
punishment under the guise of a "civil" proceeding if the Government
is dissatisfied with the punishment obtained in the first proceeding.'4'
4. The Court Retreats from Its Halper Decision
The Halper decision was unanimous, so even if the "retreat" was
just the adoption of Scalia and Thomas, Scalia had to depart from his
earlier supporting position of the Halper majority. Despite the
unanimous judgment in Halper, the notion that excessive civil
sanctions could constitute punishment under the Double Jeopardy
Clause has been sharply criticized since 1989.142 For example, in
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch ("Kurth Ranch"),
a five-member majority'43 ruled that a tax that required the defendants
to pay 800% of the value of the marijuana they harvested was so
punitive that it invoked the protections against multiple punishments
under Double Jeopardy provisions of the Constitution. 144 Justices
Scalia and Thomas sharply criticized this opinion as well as the Halper
decision for deviating from the language of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 145 According to Justice Scalia, the Fifth Amendment protects
only against multiple criminal trials, not multiple punishments. 146
Thus, the majority's decision in Kurth Ranch, along with United
States v. Halper, was incorrectly based on 120 years of dicta. 147 The
Halper decision was similarly criticized the following term in Witte v.
United States.148
141. See id. at 451 n.10.
142. See Hudson, 118 S.Ct. at 494 (stating that the Halper decision was "ill
considered" and deviated from traditional double jeopardy doctrine); see also Witte v.
United States, 515 U.S. 389, 406-407 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring); Department of
Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 800-803 (1994) (Scalia, J.
dissenting).
143. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court with which Justices Kennedy,
Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg joined. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 767-84. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor each filed dissenting opinions that were based upon the
view that the Montana tax was reasonably related to remedial state purposes. See id. at
785-91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see id. at 792-98 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia's dissent, which was joined by Justice Thomas, was based on the view that the
Fifth Amendment does not protect against multiple punishments. See id. at 798-808
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
144. See id. at 783-84 (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 452); U.S. CONST. amend. V.
145. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 798-808 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
146. See id. at 804-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. See id. at 800 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 452; Ex parte
Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall) 163, 170 (1873)).
148. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 406-07 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). In sentencing the defendant for his guilty plea of conspiring to possess
marijuana with the intent to distribute, which occurred in 1990, the trial court judge took
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The most significant blow to Halper was Hudson v. United
States.149 In Hudson, bankers who made unlawful loans in order to
benefit themselves were-debarred from the banking industry and
assessed penalties reaching $16,500.150 Subsequently, the bankers
were tried in criminal court for the same conduct which precipitated the
penalties levied by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. 5'
Because of the Halper decision, the District Court dismissed the
charges against Hudson, which were based on monetary sanctions.
5 2
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the District Court and
concluded that the fines imposed were not so grossly disproportionate
as to render them punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 15 3 In
granting certiorari, the Court took this opportunity to revisit Halper
and put its "unworkable"'154 and "ill considered"'55 test "back in [its]
bottle."' 56 Under Halper, one would not know whether civil sanctions
that are imposed following a criminal trial are so severe as to constitute
criminal punishment until after the trial has proceeded to judgment.'57
Because double jeopardy could not be considered until after the
conclusion of the second trial, the majority criticized Halper as failing
to prevent the government from "even attempting a second time to
into account Witte's involvement in a conspiracy to possess marijuana and cocaine that
occurred in 1991 and was not part of Witte's plea. See id. at 393. The judge's
consideration of this earlier conduct resulted in an increased sentence under United States
Sentencing Guidelines. See id. at 395. When Witte was subsequently indicted for the
1991 cocaine possession conspiracy, Witte argued that he had already been punished for
this act and could not be punished again under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at
394-95; U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court rejected Witte's argument that this
was a multiple punishment and held that the "use of evidence of related criminal conduct
to enhance a defendant's sentence for a separate crime within the authorized statutory
limits does not constitute punishment for that conduct within the meaning of the Double
Jeopardy Clause." Witte, 515 U.S. at 399 (citing Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576,
586 (1959)). Justice Scalia viewed the Court's decision as completely inconsistent with
the holding in Halper and stated that the Court "created a right against multiple
punishments ex nihirio[;] we now allow that right to be destroyed by the technique used
on the petitioner here .... " Witte, 515 U.S. at 407 (Scalia, J., concurring). Had the
Court in Halper not deviated from the language of the Fifth Amendment, the inconsistent
result reached in this case never would have occurred. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
149. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 491.
150. See id. at 492.
151. See id. at 492-93.
152. See id. at 492.
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 497 (Scalia, J. concurring) (citing Department of Revenue of Mont. v.
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 803-05 (1994) (Scalia, J. dissenting), which compared the
aberration of Halper to a genie that has escaped its bottle).
157. See id. at 495.
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punish criminally."' 58
While maintaining the central holding in Halper, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion significantly limited the Halper opinion and
reclaimed Kennedy v. Martinez-Mendoza and Ward as the appropriate
cases to be employed in determining whether a civil sanction in reality
constitutes a criminal punishment. 59 Based on the Ward and
Martinez-Mendoza opinions, the Court employed a two-prong test for
determining whether or not a successive criminal punishment has been
imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 6 ° Inquiry begins
with determining whether the legislature, in establishing penalties,
expressly or implicitly preferred either the label of civil or criminal.' 6 '
Subsequently, if the intention of the legislature was to impose a civil
sanction, then the Court will ask whether the statute was so punitive in
purpose or effect so as to transform the civil sanction into a civil
penalty.'62 The second prong relating to the punitive purpose or effect
can be assessed based on the guideposts provided in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez.163 The Court concluded that while the sanctions
imposed in this case, including money penalties and debarment, were
deterrents to others who might engage in the same activity as Hudson,
the "mere presence" of deterrence, one potential goal for punishment,
was "insufficient to render the sanction criminal" for double jeopardy
purposes.
164
Justice Scalia's concurrence applauded the majority's conclusion
that Halper was ill-considered and unworkable but wrote separately to
reiterate his belief that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
successive criminal prosecutions, not successive punishments. 65
Justice Scalia also viewed the majority as creating a reformulation of
the Court's double jeopardy analysis, which would only prohibit
multiple punishments that stem from successive criminal
prosecutions. 166
158. Id. (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)).
159. See id. at 493.
160. See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist read Halper as establishing one factor listed in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, namely whether the sanction was excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigne-as dispositive. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)); see also
Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956).
163. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 493; see also supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez decision).
164. Hudson, 118 S.Ct. at 496.
165. See id. at 496-97 (Scalia, J., concurring).
166. See id. at 497 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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While Justice Stevens concurred in the ultimate judgment that
Hudson could be susceptible to criminal sanctions following civil
penalties, Justice Stevens rejected the majority's rationale.'67 Justice
Stevens believed that the criminal trial was based on different elements
than the acts that substantiated the preceding civil sanctions; therefore,
there was no potential double jeopardy.168 Justice Stevens' opinion
went on to criticize the majority's hasty treatment of Halper because
the holding in Halper was narrow 69 and was to be used "for the rare
case."' 7° Justice Stevens concluded by agreeing with the majority that
the government cannot use the "civil" label to implement further
punishments after a criminal sanction has already been imposed.' 7'
5. The Court's Punishment Analysis When Civil Sanctions Involve
Committing Sexually Violent Persons
In a case that was decided between the dates of the Ward and Halper
decisions, the Court considered whether an Illinois statute that allowed
the State to involuntarily commit sexually violent persons in order to
provide them treatment in lieu of prison actually constituted a criminal
proceeding.72 In Allen v. Illinois, the Illinois attorney general decided
to pursue an involuntary commitment of the defendant, Terry Allen, as
a sexually dangerous person after the criminal charges of "unlawful
restraint and deviate sexual assault" against him were dropped for lack
of probable cause and again after Allen was recharged by
indictment. 7 3 The commitment proceeding required Mr. Allen to
submit to psychological evaluations to determine if he was mentally ill
or had criminal propensities to commit sexual assaults. 174 Mr. Allen
protested that these examinations violated his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. 175 In order for his arguments to succeed,
Mr. Allen had to show that the proceedings were indeed criminal and
167. See id. at 497-501 (Stevens, J., concurring).
168. See id. at 497 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299 (1932)).
169. See id. at 498 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Ursery, 116
S.Ct. 2135, 2145 n.2 (1996) (stating that Halper was not a "sweeping change in the
law," but instead a very "narrow" decision).
170. Id. at 499; see Halper v. United States, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989) (per curiam)
(stating that the rare case in which this rule was to be applied was where a person has
already been punished in a criminal prosecution and is subsequently subjected to a civil
sanction which is disproportionate to the damages he has caused).
171. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 499 (Stevens, J., concurring).
172. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (5-4 decision).
173. Id. at 365-66.
174. See id. at 366.
175. See id.
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not civil. 7 Mr. Allen argued that because his commitment proceeding
was based upon an alleged criminal act and provided many of the same
protections granted in a criminal hearing, the proceeding was
criminal.' In rejecting these arguments, the Court stated that Illinois
disavowed any interest in punishment by providing treatment for those
it commits and allowing those committed to be released after "the
briefest time in confinement."' 78 The State was not acting out of
retribution or seeking to deter crime. 179 Mr. Allen's past criminal
behavior was not used as a basis for punishment, but as a predictor of
future behavior.180 Had the State failed to provide treatment, and had
Mr. Allen been able to demonstrate that he would not be treated any
differently than a prisoner, then the majority surmised that "this might
well be a different case.''
In a dissent joined by three other justices, Justice Stevens stated that
"[w]hen the criminal law casts so long a shadow on a putatively civil
proceeding, I think it clear that the procedure must be deemed a
'criminal case' within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment."'82 The
dissenting Justices viewed the label of "sexually dangerous person" to
be so stigmatizing as to be "at least as serious as a guilty verdict in a
typical criminal trial."'' 83 Moreover, the commitment was indefinite,
thereby allowing for a much longer imprisonment than a mere finding
of guilt on an analogous charge.'84 Furthermore, the proceeding was
prompted by a previous criminal charge and drew upon criminal
burdens of proof and definitions contained in criminal codes, all of
which tended to show that the proceeding was indeed criminal in
effect. 18  The dissent summarized its view by stating that a civil
commitment proceeding that: is triggered by a criminal incident; makes
the state the prosecuting authority; proceeds only if a criminal offense
is established; uses many of the protections of a criminal proceeding,
and; has the same consequences as incarceration in the state's prison'86
176. See id. at 368-69.
177. See id. at 370-71.
178. Id. at 370.
179. See id. (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)).
180. See id. at 371 (citing the Illinois Supreme Court's findings in People v. Allen,
481 N.E.2d 690, 697 (I11. 1985)).
181. Id. at 373.
182. Id. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
183. Id. at 377 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the same Illinois statute in United
States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975)).
185. See id. at 378-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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is a criminal proceeding for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment. 8 7
D. The Kansas Sexually Violent Predators Act
In 1994, Kansas enacted the Sexually Violent Predators Act (the
"Act"), which was designed to allow the state to involuntarily civilly
commit sexually dangerous predators.'88 The purpose of the Act was
to provide "long-term" treatment to "sexually violent predators"
outside of the prison setting that the legislature determined to be
generally "poor" for providing such treatment.8 9
The Act defined a "Sexually Violent Predator" as "any person who
has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and
who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which
makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual
violence."' 9 A "mental abnormality" is defined as "any congenital or
acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree
constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of
187. See id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994). In its findings the Kansas legislature
stated:
[A] small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist
who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for
involuntary treatment pursuant to the treatment act for mentally ill persons
defined in K.S.A. 59-2901 et seq. and amendments thereto, which is intended
to provide short-term treatment to individuals with serious mental disorders
and then return them to the community. In contrast to persons appropriate for
civil commitment under K.S.A. 59-2901 et seq. and amendments thereto,
sexually violent predators generally have antisocial personality features
which are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities and
those features render them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior. The
legislature further finds that sexually violent predators' likelihood of
engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high. The existing
involuntary commitment procedure pursuant to the treatment act for mentally
ill persons defined in K.S.A. 59-2901 et seq. and amendments thereto is
inadequate to address the risk these sexually violent predators pose to society.
The legislature further finds that the prognosis for rehabilitating sexually
violent predators in a prison setting is poor, the treatment needs of this
population are very long-term and the treatment modalities for this population
are very different than the traditional treatment. modalities for people
appropriate for commitment under the treatment act for mentally ill persons
defined in (citation omitted) therefore a civil commitment procedure for the
long-term.care and treatment of the sexually violent predator is found to be
necessary by the legislature.
Id. § 59-29a01.
189. Id.
190. Id. § 59-29a02(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997), amended by 1998 Kan. Sess. Laws 198.
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others."'19 1
Civil commitments for sexually violent predators are initiated when
an agency with proper jurisdiction provides ninety-day written notice
to the Attorney General 92 that someone who has been previously
convicted of a "sexually violent" offense and may meet the criteria of a
sexually violent predator' 93 is expected to be released from
confinement.' 94 The Attorney General is also to be notified in writing
ninety days prior to the release of a person who was charged with a
sexually violent offense but was declared incompetent to stand trial 95
or was found not guilty by reason of insanity.1 96 When reporting the
upcoming release of an individual who may be subject to involuntary
commitment, the releasing agency is required to provide the attorney
general with that person's name, identifying factors, anticipated place
of residence upon release, offense history,'97 and documentation of the
person's institutional adjustment and any treatment received.' 98 At this
point, a review committee appointed by the Attorney General'99 and a
separate review committee appointed by the Secretary of Corrections 2°
individually assess the data to determine whether the person is a
sexually violent predator.2"'
If the Attorney General's committee concludes that the person is a
sexually violent predator, then the attorney general may file a petition
within seventy-five days from the date of the original written notice
alleging that the person is a sexually violent predator.2"2 This petition
191. Id. § 59-29a02(b) (1994 & Supp. 1997), amended by 1998 Kan. Sess. Laws
198.
192. See id. § 59-29a03(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997). An agency with jurisdiction is
defined as "that agency which releases upon lawful order or authority a person serving a
sentence or term of confinement and includes the department of corrections, the
department of social and rehabilitation services and the Kansas parole board." Id. § 59-
29a02(f) (1994 & Supp. 1997), amended by 1998 Kan. Sess. Laws 198.
193. See id. § 59-29a02(a) (Supp. 1997) (amending KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a)
(1994)).
194. See id. § 59-29a03(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
195. See id. § 59-29a03(a)(2).
196. See id. § 59-29a03(a)(3).
197. See id. § 59-29a03(b)(1).
198. See id. § 59-29a03(b)(2).
199. See id. § 59-29a03(e) (Supp. 1997).
200. See id. § 59-29a03(d). The recommendation made by this committee is an
assessment and is not determinative in how the attorney general's committee assesses
the data. See id. § 59-29a03(e).
201. See id. § 59-29a03(e).
202. See id. § 59-29a04 (Supp. 1997) (amending KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a04
(1994) (increasing the time to file the petition from forty-five to seventy-five days)).
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must contain sufficient facts to support such allegation.2 °3 If there are
sufficient facts to show probable cause,2 °4 then a trial is initiated to
determine if the person is a sexually violent predator who should be
committed.2 5 The trial provides the criminal law protections of a jury
trial, free counsel for indigent defendant, and the right to call and
cross-examine witnesses. 2 6 The trier of fact must find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is a sexually violent predator.2°
Once committed, the "predator" is placed in the custody of the
Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services in a secure facility for
"control, care and treatment until such time as the person's abnormality
or personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at
large. 20 8 The committed person is entitled to a yearly review of his
mental condition. 20 9 At that time, the court conducts a hearing to
determine whether probable cause exists "to believe the person's
mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the
person is safe to be at large and will not engage in acts of sexual
violence if discharged., 210 If probable cause is found, then the court
initiates a proceeding with the same procedural protections granted
during the initial commitment proceedings. 211 The state then has the
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person's mental
disorder remains such that the person is unstable and "if released is
likely to engage in acts of sexual violence. 212
III. DISCUSSION
A. Facts of the Case
In 1984, Leroy Hendricks pled guilty to two counts of taking
indecent liberties with a child.213 At the time of his guilty plea, Mr.
203. See id.
204. See id. § 59-29a05 (Supp. 1997) (amending KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a05
(1994)). The statute also permits the defendant to retain medical experts on his behalf
and provides a medical examination free if the defendant is indigent. See id.
205. See id. § 59-29a06 (Supp. 1997) (amending KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a06
(1994) (increasing the time for initiating trial from forty-five to sixty days after
probable cause hearing)).
206. See id.
207. See id. § 59-29a07 (Supp. 1997).
208. Id.
209. See id. § 59-29a08 (1994 & Supp. 1997), amended by 1998 Kan. Sess. Laws
198.
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130 (Kan. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Kansas v.
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Hendricks had a history of taking indecent liberties with children that
spanned thirty years.21 4 In November of 1984, Mr. Hendricks was
sentenced to five to twenty years under two counts of taking indecent
liberties with a child.21 5 Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State
dismissed a third count of indecent liberties and refrained from
requesting imposition of the Habitual Criminal Act.216 While Mr.
Hendricks was imprisoned, Don Gideon killed Stephanie Schmidt, the
murder that was the impetus to the Sexually Violent Predators Act.217
Mr. Hendricks's sentence was to expire in 1994,218 but the State
sought to make Hendricks the first person committed under its new
SVPA.2 19 In his commitment hearing, a jury found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Hendricks was a sexually violent
predator.22 ° Mr. Hendricks challenged the constitutionality of his
commitment on the grounds that his commitment proceeding did not
afford him due process of law,221 that the SVPA was an ex post facto
222 Atalaw, and that the commitment violated his double jeopardy rightsunder the Fifth Amendment.223
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
214. See id. at 131. Mr. Hendricks's other offenses included exposing himself to two
girls in 1955, which resulted in a fine of $2.90; playing strip poker with a girl who was
14 in 1958; molesting two boys he met while working in a carnival in 1960; and further
abuses of children in 1963, 1967 and 1978. See Brief for Respondent at *132a, *133a,
*136a, *139a-*166a, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (Nos. 95-1649, 95-
9075) (1996 WL 528985).
215. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 130.
216. Id. (referencing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4504 which would have allowed the trial
court judge to sentence Hendricks to a 40-year prison sentence, effectively confining
Hendricks for the rest of his life).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
218. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 130.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 131. Sexually violent predator is defined as "any person who has been
convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the
predatory acts of sexual violence, if not confined in a secure facility." KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-29a02(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997), amended by 1998 Kan. Sess. Laws 198.
221. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 133; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
222. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 133; see also U.S. CONST. art. I §9 cl. 3.
223. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 133; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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B. The Supreme Court of Kansas Decision
1. The Kansas Supreme Court's Majority Opinion
In finding the Kansas Sexually Violent Predators Act
unconstitutional,224 the Kansas Supreme Court looked primarily at
substantial due process considerations. 225  The court went into a
lengthy discussion of how other courts including the United States
Supreme Court have interpreted the terms "mental abnormality,"
"mental illness," and "mental disorder. 2 26  The Kansas Supreme
Court determined that "mental abnormality" is not the equivalent of
"mental illness., 227 Thus, to interpret the two similarly would allow
anyone who has been convicted of a sexually violent crime to be
diagnosed as "mentally abnormal" and involuntarily committed. 228
According to the testimony of the State's psychologist, pedophilia
constitutes a "mental abnormality" within the mental health
community, but it is not a diagnosis. 229 Rather, pedophilia describes
an abnormality or a deviance from social norms.23  Because "mental
abnormality" is not a formally recognized diagnosis, the court
considered this term as it is defined in the SVPA. 231' The State's
psychologist further testified that the legal definition is circular "in that
certain behavior defines the condition that is used to predict the
behavior., 23 2 The court ruled that a "mental abnormality" is not a
224. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138.
225. See id. The Constitution states: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
226. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 134-35. The court paid particular attention to
the Washington Supreme Court and its interpretation of Washington's sexual predator
statute, because Kansas's SVPA was based in large part on the Washington statute. See
id. at 135 (discussing Personal Restraint of Young, 857 P.2d 989 (1993)). The Kansas
court also analyzed the United States Supreme Court holding in Foucha v. Louisiana
which required that involuntarily committed persons be both "mentally ill" and
dangerous. See id. at 134-35 (discussing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78 (1992)).
227. See id. at 135.
228. See id at 136.
229. See id. at 137.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 137-38. The court referred to KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b), stating:
"Mental abnormality means a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional
or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent
offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of
others." Id. at 138 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
232. Id. at 137-38. The circularity argument the court put forth was that the mental
abnormality was based upon a person's likelihood of committing future acts of sexual
violence, but the likelihood of committing future acts of sexual violence was based on
whether or not the person had been convicted of a previous act of sexual violence. See
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"mental illness. ' 233 Therefore, based upon the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Foucha v. Louisiana, which requires involuntarily
committed persons be both mentally ill and dangerous, the Kansas
Supreme Court concluded that the "mental illness" prong was not
satisfied and Hendricks could not constitutionally be involuntarily
committed.234
Furthermore, the court found that "the overriding concern of the
legislature is to continue the segregation of sexually violent offenders
from the public., 235 The court determined that, in actuality, little
treatment is provided for sexually violent predators under the statute's
provisions. 236 The Kansas Supreme Court also regarded this further
incarceration of Mr. Hendricks as an attempt by the State to rectify its
unreasonably low sentence of ten years for a repeat pedophile. 237 As
such, the primary objective of the Act is to "continue incarceration and
not to provide treatment., 2
31
2. The Dissenting Opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court
Justice Larson's dissent criticized the majority's due process
analysis because it did not address directly what test should be used to
render the Sexually Violent Predators Act unconstitutional.239 Justice
Larson stated that a two-tiered analysis must be applied to an act which
purportedly violates due process. 24" The first step is to determine
whether a fundamental right is involved. 21  A fundamental right is
involved when a case involves "suspect classifications such as race,
ancestry, and alienage, and fundamental rights expressly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution., 24 2 The next step is the application of
the appropriate test.243 When a fundamental right, such as the loss of
233. See id. at 138.
234. See id. at 138; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78 (1992).
235. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 136.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 137.
238. Id. at 136. In a concurring opinion, Justice Lockett stated that the defendant
could have served the rest of his life in prison, but was sentenced to 5 to 20 years and
served that sentence. See id. at 139 (Locket, J., concurring). To commit him now would
be violative of the Constitution, because this was a second punishment. See id.
(Lockett, J., concurring).
239. See id. at 144 (Larson, J., dissenting).
240. See id. at 145 (Larson, J., dissenting).
241. See id. (Larson, J., dissenting).
242. Id. (Larson, J., dissenting) (quoting Farley v. Engelken, 740 P.2d 1058 (Kan.
1987)).
243. See id. (Larson, J., dissenting).
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liberty, is at stake a strict scrutiny test must be applied.2" Under strict
scrutiny, the state must show a compelling state interest for its action,
and that the state action was narrowly tailored to meet the compelling
state interest. 24 5 Moreover, the presumption of constitutionality is
greatly diminished when a statute involves a fundamental right.246
Justice Larson recognized that there was clearly a fundamental right at
issue in the present case, 247 but the Justice maintained that the State
met its burden of showing a compelling interest in acting as it did and
that the action it took was narrowly tailored to serve that end.248
Justice Larson found that the Act was narrowly tailored because of its
requirement of finding proof beyond a reasonable doubt before any
commitment may occur."' The use of the highest burden of proof
demonstrates that the State sought an exceptionally limited application
of the Act.250
The dissent continued its attack on the majority's opinion by
distinguishing Foucha v. LouisianaSl from the present case.252 The
statute under consideration in Foucha was ruled unconstitutional
because it allowed for the indefinite commitment of a person solely
because he was dangerous, and not because he was dangerous and
mentally ill.253  The Kansas statute required, however, that the
committed person be released as soon as he demonstrated that he no
longer suffered from a "mental abnormality. 254 The dissent went on
to address Hendricks's other charges against the Act, such as his claim
that the Act violated his double jeopardy rights.255 Since the dissent
244. See id. (Larson, J., dissenting).
245. See id. (Larson, J., dissenting).
246. See id. (Larson, J., dissenting).
247. See id. (Larson, J., dissenting).
248. See id. at 145-46 (Larson, J., dissenting).
249. See id. at 146 (Larson, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying notes
172-190.
250. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 146. In support of the position that the SVPA
is to be very narrowly applied, the dissent pointed to Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979), which held that clear and convincing proof is sufficient to involuntarily commit
a person. See id. (discussing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979)). The
Addington court reasoned that to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt would create an
almost insurmountable barrier to committing those who are mentally ill and dangerous.
See Addington, 441 U.S. at 429.
251. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
252. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 147 (Larson, J., dissenting) (distinguishing
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. at 80).
253. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
254. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 147 (referring to KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08).
255. See id. at 150-55 (Larson, J., dissenting).
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considered the commitment proceedings to be civil and not criminal,256
Hendricks would have to show that the civil commitment, although
technically a civil sanction, was so punitive so as to constitute
punishment. 7 The dissent determined that the commitment did not
constitute punishment under this standard either.258  Finally, the
dissent rejected Hendricks's ex post facto claim 9.25  An ex post facto
claim requires the infliction of a criminal penalty for an act that was
innocent when performed.26 ° Since the dissent did not regard the
commitment of Leroy Hendricks to be a criminal penalty, there could
be no violation of the ex post facto provisions of the Constitution.26
C. The United States Supreme Court Decision
In Kansas v. Hendricks,262 the United States Supreme Court faced
the same issues that the Kansas Supreme Court faced, namely whether
Kansas's Sexually Violent Predators Act violated substantive due
process,263 whether it violated the Double Jeopardy provisions of the
Fifth Amendment 264 and whether it was an ex post facto law. 265
Speaking for the Court, Justice Thomas rejected these three claims and
found the Act constitutional. 266
1. The Majority Opinion
Justice Thomas' majority opinion regarded the term "mental
abnormality" as substantively synonymous with "mental illness. 267
Therefore, the Kansas Supreme Court erred in determining that this
due process requirement for civil commitments had not been met.268
256. See id. at 151-53 (Larson, J., dissenting). The majority did not delve into
Hendricks's other claims since it found the act unconstitutional based upon the due
process claims. See id. at 138; see also supra text accompanying notes 219-238.
257. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 154 (Larson, J., dissenting) (discussing United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989)); see also supra text accompanying notes
113-140.
258. See id. (Larson, J., dissenting).
259. See id. (Larson, J., dissenting).
260. See id. at 154 (Larson, J., dissenting); U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl. 3.
261. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 154 (Larson, J., dissenting).
262. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997), rev'g In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996).
263. See id. at 2079.
264. See id. at 2081.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 2086.
267. See id. at 2080-81.
268. See id. at 2080. Justice Thomas referred to other cases in which the Court has
accepted varied legal terms defining "mental illness" for the basis of civil commitments.
See id. at 2080-81 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979) (using the
terms "emotionally disturbed" and "mentally ill."); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715,
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Although the term "mental abnormality" is not a medical diagnosis, the
majority found that the legal definition sufficiently considered issues
such as individual responsibility and competency.26 9 Justice Thomas
further declared, in a manner consistent with the dissent in the Kansas
Supreme Court, that the Act was not punitive. 270 As such, it could not
violate either the Double Jeopardy protections granted under the Fifth
Amendment or the prohibition against ex post facto laws.271
The majority elaborated by noting that the Kansas Act expressly
required the proceedings to be civil.272 As a result, the defendant must
provide "the clearest proof' that the purpose or effect of the statutory
scheme is "so punitive" as to negate the state's intention.273 Hendricks
argued that the use of criminal procedure aspects in the civil
commitment hearing, including a trial by jury, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, cross examination of witnesses, the right to an
attorney if the defendant is indigent, and the state's role serving as
prosecutor, demonstrated that the statute's purpose was punitive.274
The majority rejected the argument that these procedural protections
necessarily changed the nature of the proceedings from civil to
criminal.275 Instead, Justice Thomas concluded that the State chose to
implement these measures in order to ensure greater fairness, and that
these protections were insufficient to render Mr. Hendricks's
commitment hearing a criminal proceeding. 276
Hendricks also argued that, even though required by the statute,277
732 (1972) (holding acceptable the terms "incompetency" and "insanity"); Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 88 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (recognizing the State's authority to commit a person when a "medical
justification for doing so" exists)).
269. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081; see also Jules B. Gerard, The Usefulness of
the Medical Model to the Legal System, 39 RUTGERS L. REv. 377, 391-94 (1987)
(comparing the legal and medical professions purposes in recognizing mental illness).
270. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082-85.
271. See id. at 2081; see also In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 151-52 (Larson, J.,
dissenting). See generally supra text accompanying notes 252-257.
272. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994)).
Sexually violent predators should undergo "a civil commitment procedure for [their]
long term care and treatment." Id.
273. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082; see also supra text accompanying notes 101-
113.
274. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083 (referencing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a06,
59-29a07); see also supra Part II and text accompanying notes 182-86.
275. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083.
276. See id. at 2083; see also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 370 (1986); supra Part
II.C.5. (detailing the Allen decision and stating that the use of criminal proceeding
protections in a civil commitment hearing does not in and of itself make the proceeding
criminal) (emphasis added).
277. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084-85 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01,
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no legitimate treatment was provided.278 Without treatment the statute
amounted to nothing more than further incarceration for his previous
279crimes. Justice Thomas countered by reading the Supreme Court of
Kansas opinion to say that Hendricks's abnormality was
untreatable. 2" The majority held that even a lack of treatment
alternatives did not undermine the legitimate civil goal of segregating
sexually violent offenders from the rest of society.28'
The majority further addressed the civil nature of the sanction and
noted that the SVPA is not punitive because it does not serve either of
the purposes of punishment, namely retribution or deterrence.282 The
lack of a scienter requirement for involuntary comniitment under the
Act provided further evidence of the civil purpose of the statute.283
The majority opinion went on to state that the use of an historically
punitive restraint failed to change the nature of the proceeding in the
Court's opinion because the commitment of sexually 'violent predators
serves a legitimate, non-punitive purpose.2 84  The Court further
rejected Hendricks's argument that the potentially indefinite nature of
the confinement demonstrated the state's punitive intent.285 The Court
did not consider the commitment indefinite because the statutory
provisions allow for immediate release when a sexually violent
predator shows that he is "safe to be at large. '286
In considering Hendricks's Double Jeopardy claim, the majority
stated that the issue of multiple criminal trials for the same conduct did
not apply because the proceedings were civil in nature.287 In addition,
the Court did not regard the commitment as a punishment.2 8
Therefore, Hendricks could not succeed on any arguments concerning
violations of the prohibition against multiple punishments.2 89
Accordingly, the Court rejected the respondent's ex post facto claims
59-29a07(a), 59-29a09).
278. See id. at 2083.
279. See id. at 2083-84 (referring to the findings of the Kansas Supreme Court which
stated that treatment is "all but nonexistent"); see also supra text accompanying notes
224-238 (discussing the Supreme Court's findings).
280. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084.
281. See id.
282. See id. at 2082-83.
283. See id. (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)).
284. See id. at 2083.
285. See id.
286. See id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. §59-29a07).
287. See id. at 2086.
288. See id.
289. See id.
1998] 119
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
because there was no punitive measure imposed on Mr. Hendricks.29 °
2. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
Although Justice Kennedy joined in the majority opinion, he also
submitted a brief opinion "to caution against dangers inherent when a
civil confinement law is used in conjunction with the criminal
process.2 91 Justice Kennedy agreed with the judgment of the Court,
but warned that the civil system may not be used to impose
punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the
criminal side.292 If in future cases, the term "mental abnormality is too
imprecise a category" to provide a solid basis for civil commitment,
then the term should be struck down.293 For the time being, however,
Justice Kennedy was satisfied that the Act was constitutional and did
not impose a second punishment. 94
3. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer began his dissent by stating that he agreed with the
majority that the Kansas Supreme Court was in error for declaring that
the term "mental abnormality" was substantially different than "mental
illness" as far as due process rights are concerned. 295 The dissent
disagreed with the majority's determination that the Sexually Violent
Predators Act was not punitive.296
Justice Breyer pointed out the obvious similarities between the civil
commitment of sexually violent predators under the Kansas Act and
traditional criminal punishment.297 The resemblances included the
state's use of "secure" confinement and the fact that this incarceration
was against the will of the patient.298 Moreover, the commitment's
basic objective of preventing sexually violent predators from
committing future predatory acts through incarceration fulfilled one of
290. See id.
291. Id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
292. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
293. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
294. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
295. See id. at 2087-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer's dissent was joined
in full by Justices Stevens and Souter and joined in parts II and III (those parts not
dealing with the due process considerations) by Justice Ginsburg. See id. at 2087
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg did not, however, provide a separate opinion
regarding whether the term "mental abnormality" met the due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
296. See id. at 2090 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
297. See id. at 2090-91 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
298. See id. at 2090 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a)
(1994)).
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the most basic objectives of criminal law, namely incapacitating an
individual and preventing him from committing "future mischief."299
A more in-depth analysis of the SVPA showed further punitive
intent by the Kansas legislature. 300 For example, the Act's prohibitory
or penal intent is obvious because the commitment sanctions, like
criminal punishment, are imposed only upon individuals who have
previously committed a criminal offense. 30 1 Additionally, the use of a
criminal prosecutor and the use of criminal law procedures further
demonstrate indications of penal intent.30 2 Justice Breyer conceded
that these procedural aspects in and of themselves would not be
enough to render the Act unconstitutional, but when taken together
with other aspects of the Act, the punitive intent becomes much
clearer.3 °3
The dissent also distinguished the present case from Allen v.
Illinois.3 °4 In Allen, the Court upheld the commitment of sexually
violent predators. 30 5  According to the dissenting Justices, if the
majority had applied the same factors considered in Allen, then it
would have reached the exact opposite conclusion.30 6 Here, the
Kansas Supreme Court, unlike the Illinois Supreme Court in Allen,
determined that the primary purpose of the SVPA was to punish, not
299. See id. at 2090-91 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES * 11-* 12 (describing an objective of criminal law as "depriving the party
injuring of the power to do future mischief'); 1 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5, p. 3 2 (1986); UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1,
pt. A (Nov. 1995)).
300. See id. at 2091 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
301. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a02(a) and 59-
29a03(a) (1994)).
302. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referencing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a06, 59-
29a07 (1994)).
303. See id. at 2091-92 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
304. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
305. See id. at 2092 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986);
see also supra notes 172-87 and accompanying text.
306. See id. at 2092-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Breyer
contrasted Hendricks from Allen, because in Hendricks the state supreme court
interpreted the SVPA as primarily instilling punishment, whereas in Allen, the majority
was swayed because the Illinois Supreme Court had determined the primary purpose of its
state's SVPA was providing treatment. See id. at 2092 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Additionally, the Kansas statute, unlike its Illinois counterpart, provides "treatment"
only after the defendant had served his prison sentence. See id. at 2093 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Next, unlike the law in Illinois, the SVPA adopted in Kansas did not require
the committing authority to consider using less restrictive alternatives to commitment.
See id. at 2094 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Kansas, unlike the 16 other states
which have Sexually Violent Predators Acts, requires the delay of treatment, prohibits
consideration of less restrictive alternatives and applies retroactively. See id. at 2095
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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to provide treatment. 7 Unlike the Illinois law under consideration in
Allen, Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator Act did not provide
treatment to those committed. 3 8 The Court upheld the Illinois law in
Allen v. Illinois, precisely because it provided treatment in lieu of
prison to those committed under it.309 Contrary to the view of the
majority, the dissent read the record as indicating that the State of
Kansas was not providing treatment to Mr. Hendricks, as is required
under the SVPA, because of a lack of funding or planning on the part
of the state, not because Mr. Hendricks was unamenable to
treatment. 310 The state's failure to provide treatment, coupled with
statements from the Act's official supporters that the Act provided an
opportunity to permanently confine sexually violent predators further,
led Justice Breyer to regard the intent of the legislation to be
punitive.31
Moreover, if the state legislators truly desired treatment for these
"predators," the dissent questioned why legislators would delay
treatment for the prisoners until years after the criminal act which
necessitated the treatment was committed. 31" The Court inferred that
this delay would only hinder the success of any imposed treatment.
313
In addition, methods less restrictive than commitment to a hospital
existed to provide treatment for a sexual offender.314 When legislators
failed to consider, or to use, "alternative and less harsh methods" to
accomplish a legitimate, nonpunitive objective, then a punitive purpose
in the resulting law can be shown.1 5
Justice Breyer continued his attack on the Kansas legislation by
307. See id. at 2090 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
308. See id. at 2092 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. at 369
(considering Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38 105-08 (1985))).
309. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 373.
310. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2093 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
311. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing State Habeas Corpus Proceeding,
App.393 at 468).
312. See id. at 2093 (citing Robert M. Wettstein, A Psychiatric Perspective on
Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 597, 617
(1992) (stating that a delay in treatment causes the offender to lose his memory
regarding the offense, thus making it more difficult for the offender to accept
responsibility while, at the same time, creating the opportunity for the offender to
create a hardened and distorted view of his crime)).
313. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
314. See id. at 2095 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Ingo Keilitz et al., Least
Restrictive Treatment of Involuntary Patients: Translating Concepts into Practice, 29
ST. Louis U. L. J. 691, 693 (1985)).
315. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539
(1979)).
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comparing it to other sexually violent predator statutes. 1 6 Of the
seventeen states that have sexually violent predator laws, only
Kansas's statute delays treatment, fails to consider less restrictive
alternatives, and applies to pre-crime acts.3"7 The dissent emphasized
that merely being the most restrictive of all of the Sexually Violent
Predator Acts does not make the Kansas act punitive per se, but its
harsh restrictiveness along with the considerations discussed above
make the punitive intent clear.
3 18
The dissenters found that there was "clear and objective evidence" to
show that the intent of the Kansas legislation was to punish.3 19 The
dissent further found that all of the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
factors are applicable to the Sexually Violent Predators Act, because
the Act: (1) applies an affirmative restraint; (2) uses a restraint which
has historically been regarded as punishment; (3 & 4) is imposed upon
behavior already a crime once scienter is found; (5) serves both of the
traditional aims of punishment, namely, deterrence and retribution; (6)
does not primarily serve an alternative purpose such as treatment; and
(7) is excessive in relation to any alternative purpose assigned.3 20
Based upon the satisfaction of all of the Mendoza-Martinez factors,
and because the SVPA, in the context of this litigation, clearly showed
the legislature's punitive intent, four justices of the court concluded
that Mr. Hendricks's Fifth Amendment protections against double
jeopardy had been violated.321 The Justices in the dissent concluded
that Kansas's failure to provide treatment, failure to provide less
restrictive methods of treatment, delay of treatment, and satisfaction of
all of the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez factors transformed the
purported "civil" commitment into criminal punishment, thereby
316. See id. at 2095-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (reviewing the following statutes:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4601 et seq. (Supp. 1996-1997); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
ANN. § 6600 et seq. (West Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11.7-101 et seq. (Supp.
1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-556 et seq. (1992 and Supp. 1996); 725 ILCS § 205 et
seq (1994); IOWA CODE ANN. ch. 709c (Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 et seq
(1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 123A (Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN., ch. 253B (1994
and Supp. 1996-1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2923 et seq. (Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT.
ANN. 30:4-82.4 et seq. (West 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-1 et seq. (1993); ORE.
STAT. § 426.510 et seq. (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-301 et seq. (1984 and Supp.
1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16-1 et seq. (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.01 et
seq. (1992 and Supp. 1996-1997) and Wis. STAT. § 980.01 et seq. (1996)).
317. See id. at 2099 app. A.
3 18. See id. at 2095 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
319. See id. at 2098 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Ward 448 U.S.
242, 249 (1980); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
320. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2098 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (applying Kennedy,
372 U.S. at 169).
321. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.3 22
IV. ANALYSIS
In holding the Kansas Sexually Violent Predators Act of 1994
constitutional, the majority considered the purpose, effect and
procedures that accompanied the act in isolation of one another.
However, the majority failed to recognize that the Act, considered in
its entirety, is clearly punitive in nature. In concluding that Kansas's
regime of committing "sexually violent predators" for "very long"
terms does not constitute punishment, the majority misinterprets the
"clearest proof' standard which has been applied in previous cases and
also ignores fundamental notions of what constitutes the core of
punishment, namely moral blame.
A. The Majority Improperly Applied "The Clearest Proof' of Punitive
Nature Standard
The majority correctly begins its analysis of whether the Kansas
statute is punitive or civil in nature by looking to the express or implied
intent of the statute.323 The statute expressly states that involuntary
commitments are "civil" in nature. 324 The majority properly observes
that while this label is not dispositive, the statute will only be reversed
if the defendant can show, with the "clearest proof," the punitive
purpose or effect of the statute.325
Because the majority did not look to the legislative history of the
statute for "objective manifestations" of the punitive purposes of the
Act, it failed to properly interpret or apply the "clearest proof"
standard.326 In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, house debates and
letters from the Attorney General discussing the statute under
inspection provided "inescapable" and objective proof of the penal
intent of the statute. 327 Had the majority looked at the same types of
322. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
323. See id. at 2081-82; supra Part III.C.1; see also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S.
242, 248-49 (1980); supra Part II.C.2.
324. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994).
325. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
326. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963); see also
supra text accompanying notes 89-99.
327. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 183. The Court termed the proof as "inescapable"
proof in addressing the statute at issue in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. See id. Since
the majority opinion cited Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, the case which articulated
the term "clearest proof," it can reasonably be assumed that the "inescapable" proof
cited exceeds the burden of "clearest proof." See id. at 164. To satisfy the proof needed
to show the punitive intent of the statute, the Court looked at the legislative history of
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evidence in Hendricks, then a different outcome would have been
reached.
1. The Legislative History of the SVPA Clearly Shows the Act's
Punitive Intent
When the SVPA of 1994 was under consideration by the Kansas
General Assembly, the Attorney General for the State of Kansas
heralded the Act as "the most significant preventive criminal justice
legislation to be presented., 32" He stated further that the bill "will be
preventative of criminal conduct and not just punitive."32 9 The
Attorney General also noted that "[this] law will keep dangerous sex
offenders confined past their scheduled prison sentence. As I am
convinced none of them should ever be released[J" 33  Carla Stovall,
who, in 1994 was a member of the Parole Board in Kansas and
presently serves as the Attorney General for the state, declared that the
man who killed Stephanie Schmidt would "never have been released"
had this law been in place only two years prior.33' Under the
standards used in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the testimony of
these two witnesses alone sufficiently and conclusively demonstrates
the punitive purposes of the SVPA332 and should have been considered
by the majority in the present case.
Furthermore, the statements made by the Attorney General and Ms.
Stovall clearly demonstrate the desire to impose just desserts for the
wickedness of sexually violent predators.333 The proponents of this
law, from the public to the former and present Attorneys General, all
the statute at issue as well as comments made by the Attorney General regarding the
statute. See id. at 183. Specifically, the Court deemed a letter from the Attorney General
to the Chair of the Senate Immigration Committee encouraging the adoption of the bill
at issue in order to penalize those persons who evaded the draft during the Second World
War as powerful, objective evidence of the purpose of the statute. See id. Justice
Goldberg's opinion stated that the legislative history of the statute at issue, along with
the letter from the Attorney General, led to the "inescapable" conclusion that the statute
was punitive. See id.
328. Sexually Violent Predators Act, 1994: Hearings on S.B. 525 Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., Kan. Leg. (Feb. 22, 1994) (statement of Robert T. Stephan, Att'y.
Gen. of the State of Kansas).
329. See id.
330. Id.
331. Sexually Violent Predators Act, 1994: Hearings on S.B. 525 Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., Kan. Leg. (Feb. 22, 1994) (statement of Carla J. Stovall, former
member of Parole Board who has since been appointed Attorney General of Kansas).
332. See supra Part III.B.
333. See supra Part II.B, and text accompanying notes 62-81 (discussing the
philosophy of punishment).
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regard this law as "criminal justice legislation" '334 that would keep
dangerous sex offenders incarcerated beyond their scheduled prison
sentence because they should "never be released. 33 5
The majority also stated that the goals of punishment, namely
deterrence and retribution, were not served by the Act 'under
consideration.336 As the statements of Kansas's last two attorneys
general indicate, however, this law was designed to be retributive.337
Statements such as "these 'animals' should be kept in prison beyond
their scheduled sentences and never allowed out" clearly indicate a
retributive intent.3 8 Under its surface, this law was not intended to
provide treatment, but aimed at further punishing people based upon
their "bad" acts.
Furthermore, as the Court stated earlier in Department of Revenue
of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, civil fines and forfeitures deter
behaviors.339 In addition to glossing over the issue of deterrence,
Justice Thomas' opinion does not address retribution despite
overwhelming evidence of the state's retributive intent. The state's
punitive intent is clear because the record is replete with indications of
retributive intent along with the indefinite nature of the commitment
that is imposed as a deterrent.'
The people of Kansas, the Kansas Attorney General and the Kansas
legislature all regarded this law as a means of keeping "animals"
"behind bars" for a longer time than their sentences required.34' To
disguise the Sexually Violent Predators Act under the label of "civil"
law is merely a route around the protections of the Fifth
Amendment.342
2. The Majority Opinion is Inconsistent with Prior Court Decisions
The decision in Hendricks is inconsistent with the Court's previous
334. Sexually Violent Predators Act, 1994: Hearings on S.B. 525 Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., Kan. Leg. (Feb. 22, 1994) (statement of Robert T. Stephan, Att'y.
Gen. of the State of Kansas); see also discussion supra Part I.
335. Sexually Violent Predators Act, 1994: Hearings on S.B. 525 Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., Kan. Leg. (Feb. 22, 1994) (statement of Carla J. Stovall, former
member of Parole Board who has since been appointed Attorney General of Kansas).
336. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117.S. Ct. 2072, 2086 (1997).
337. See supra notes 328, 331 and accompanying text.
338. See id.
339. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778 (1994).
340. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1997).
341. See discussion supra Parts I, IW.A.1.
342. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087-98 (5-4 decision) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see
also discussion supra Part III.C.3.
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decisions. Had the majority gone beyond its flippant remark that the
Act does not seek to deter or carry out retribution, a careful
consideration of how the sanctions operate under the Act would have
revealed its punitive nature.343
Had the majority applied the Mendoza-Martinez factors, the only
factors the Court has put forth for assessing what retribution is, it
would have concluded that the indefinite commitment imposed on
Leroy Hendricks was a "criminal punishment" and not a "civil
sanction." Clearly an involuntary commitment involves an
"affirmative disability or restraint." ' 4 Furthermore, being confined
and secured in a facility operated by the Department of Corrections has
historically been regarded as a punishment.3 45 In addition, the fact that
persons are committed based upon their prior convictions essentially
provides for an extension of scienter running from the individual's
criminal trial to his civil commitment hearing.3 46 As discussed above,
commitment is based upon the desire to instill "justice" on "animals"
and to prevent those committed from committing future crimes.347
Accordingly, both of the traditional aims of punishment, retribution,
and deterrence are served by the commitment.3 48 Also, commitment
applies to behavior which is already a crime, hence the fifth Mendoza-
Martinez factor is satisfied.3 49 Ostensibly, the purpose of the SVPA
was to provide treatment, but the Supreme Court of Kansas found that
no treatment was provided.35° Since no other purposes were put forth,
it is clear that there are no "alternative purposes" for the SVPA other
than to further punish criminals.35' Finally, to the extent that treatment
is a tenable alternative purpose, an indefinite confinement is excessive
because treatments provided during a prisoner's jail time, or treatment
in a half-way house, would provide sexually violent predators with a
less restrictive alternative.352 While the state argued that the purpose of
the commitment is to treat predators, the absence of any real treatment
343. See discussion supra Part III.C. 1.
344. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
345. See id.; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (allowing
for the Department of Corrections to assume the housing of those committed under the
SVPA).
346. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 167-68.
347. See id. at 168-69.
348. See id.
349. See id.
350. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 131 (Kan. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Kansas v.
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2090 (1997).
351. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 167-68.
352. See id. at 168-69; Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2090 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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makes it clear that the majority should have been led to a different
conclusion. Because the state's highest court acts as the ultimate
interpreter of its own laws, the majority should not have dismissed the
findings of the Kansas Supreme Court.
The majority also failed to give adequate consideration to the
holding in Allen v. Illinois.3  Justice Thomas mentioned Allen only
to state that the Court has upheld previous civil commitment laws
which were provoked by prior criminal conduct. 354 The Illinois statute
in Allen was designed to provide treatment in lieu of prison sentences
for sexually dangerous predators, not in addition to prison
sentences.355 In Allen, there was no indication that the law was
designed to keep sexually dangerous predators confined forever, nor
was there any doubt that treatment was actually provided to those who
were committed.356 The Court also stated that if treatment had not
been provided, then the outcome "might well be different .... ",5 As
the Kansas Supreme Court and the dissent in Hendricks pointed out,
there was no treatment provided. 358 This is the exact scenario which
prompted the Allen Court to envision creating a different outcome.3 59
B. The Majority Opinion Is Contrary to Fundamental Notions of
What Constitutes Punishment
Applying only H. L. A. Hart's definition of punishment to the
SVPA, one would conclude that civil commitment under the Act
constitutes punishment. Confinement in a mental hospital deprives
prisoners of liberty and subjects them to what one would normally
consider "unpleasant" conditions.36° As the dissent pointed out and as
the Attorneys General for Kansas would concede, the confinement
comes about following an offense against legal rules.3 6  The
confinement of Leroy Hendricks was imposed on an actual offender
for his previous offense362 and was intentionally administered by
human beings other than the offender. 363 Finally, it was imposed and
353. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
354. See id. (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986)).
355. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 370; see also discussion supra Part III.B.
356. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 370.
357. See id. at 373.
358. See In re Hendricks, 912 F.2d at 131; Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); see also supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text.
359. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 373.
360. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
361. See supra Part lI.C.
362. See discussion supra Part III.A.
363. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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administered by the legal authority against whom the offense was
committed. 364 The additional factor of blame under Feinberg's and
Lewis' definition of punishment is revealed in the overwhelming sense
of blame contained in the testimony of the Schmidts and Attorneys
General Stovall and Stephan. 65
The plurality in Kansas v. Hendricks arrived at a decision that was
inconsistent with the facts presented it, preceding cases, and common
understandings of what constitutes punishment. The Court has often
stated that the goals of punishment are deterrence and retribution, but it
has not stated what constitutes punishment. 66 The failure of the Court
to adopt or to develop a consistent definition of punishment and
punitive intent has allowed the State of Kansas to adopt a law which
allows for multiple punishments under the guise of civil law.367
V. IMPACT
The Court's ruling in Hendricks has significantly eroded the
protections guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment by lessening the
standards states must apply in prosecuting criminals.368 Whenever a
state concludes that it has arrived at an unfavorable plea bargain in the
criminal process, it can lengthen the defendant's incarceration by
involuntarily committing him in a civil proceeding.369 The Supreme
Court's willingness to allow a state to inflict what is clearly a second
punishment on a defendant,37° based upon political pressure and public
animosity towards a notorious individual37 after the defendant has
served the majority of his sentence,372 through a civil forum, corrupts
the very reasons for having the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.373 While
the criminal and civil law have experienced some interweaving of
concepts, the Hendricks opinion strikes a severe blow to the very
concept of punishment, one of few remaining divisions between the
criminal and civil law.374
When a state incarcerates an individual to impose moral blame
364. See discussion supra Part III.A.
365. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
366. See supra Part II.C.
367. See supra Part II.D.
368. See supra Part II.C.
369. See supra Part III.A.
370. See supra Parts II.B., II.C.1-3.
371. See supra Parts I, ILA, IV.A.1.
372. See supra Part III.A.
373. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
374. See supra Part H.A.
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because of his wicked acts and for being a "predator," and not to treat
the individual, the state punishes that individual.3 75 Leroy Hendricks
committed wicked acts and was subject to spending the rest of his life
in jail for the crimes he committed against children in 1984.376
Hendricks probably deserved to spend the rest of his life in prison,
and the SVPA was passed so the state could continue to incarcerate the
"animals" who commit wicked acts. 377
C.S. Lewis stated that the link between justice and punishment is
desert.37 8 Punishment in the form of incarceration is fair when it is
deserved. It does not make sense to speak of a "just" treatment.
Because Hendricks was not receiving treatment,379 was subject to an
unpleasant experience, 380 was the subject of "criminal justice, '381 and
was subject to further incarceration because he "deserved" it, he was in
every sense of the word being punished.
The Hendricks holding now gives states the opportunity to pursue
incarceration of the wicked, no matter what their wicked deed may
have been, through civil proceedings that do not require the protections
of criminal proceedings. 3 8  For example, suppose the state attempted
to punish a defendant in a criminal court and the defendant was found
not guilty. If it had a law like the one analyzed in Hendricks, the state
could try the same defendant in a "civil proceeding" in order to "treat"
that person.383 Regardless of which forum succeeds in incarcerating
the defendant, the net result is still the same: the defendant loses his
liberty;384 is removed from society;385 is stigmatized as a "sexually
violent predator";386 and is incarcerated for an indefinite term387 until
either the state has succeeded in treating his "untreatable '38 8 disease or
he has grown wise enough to appear cured.389
Because criminal proceedings require greater protections for
375. See supra Part II.B.
376. See supra Part IM.A.
377. See supra Part II.D.
378. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
379. See supra Part IV.A.2.
380. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
381. See supra Part IW.A. 1.
382. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2074.
383. See supra Part III.B.1-C.3.
384. . See supra Part I.D.
385. See supra Part II.D.
386. See supra Part II.D.
387. See supra Part H.D.
388. See supra Part IL.D.
389. See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
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defendants than do civil proceedings, it is likely that state legislators,
under pressure from inflamed citizens, will paradoxically turn to civil
proceedings to incarcerate "animals" and "predators" in order to prove
to voters that they are tough on crime.3 90
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1963, the Court attempted to provide "guideposts" as to what
constitutes punishment in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. The Court
has been extremely inconsistent in how it applies the Mendoza-
Martinez factors. This inconsistency has resulted not only in
confusion in the Court but has allowed the states to continue to push
the envelope of what constitutes punishment. The Kansas v.
Hendricks decision failed to recognize punishment as it has been
considered, although not defined in earlier cases and was oblivious to
how legal theorists and philosophers traditionally think about
punishment. The net result is further confusion and greater latitude for
the states in determining how they can punish criminals. The
protections that are granted to the citizens of the United States under
the Fifth Amendment have been further eroded as the distinction
between civil and criminal proceedings exists in name only. It is no
longer the police state that citizens must fear; rather, it is the
administrative state.
ANDREW D. CAMPBELL
390. See e.g., Christi Parsons, Jury Out on Sex-Offender Law: Long Sentences
Expensive, Rehabilitation Doubtful, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 28, 1998, at Al. Illinois
has recently amended its Sexually Violent Persons Act to allow for indefinite
involuntary civil commitment for defendants after they have served their prison
sentences. See id. However, the Illinois law does provide for treatment. See id.
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